ONE OF THE LAST MEN

chapter 5 THE RUSSO-GERMAN WA

The discrepancy between communist theory and individualist practice in Russia was

one cause of the next disaster which befell Europe. Between Russia and Germany

there should have been close partnership, based on interchange of machinery and

corn. But the theory of communism stood in the way, and in a strange manner.

Russian industrial organization had proved impossible without American capital; and

little by little this influence had transformed the communistic system. From the Baltic

to the Himalayas and the Behring Straits, pasture, timber lands, machine-tilled cornland,

oilfields, and a spreading rash of industrial towns, were increasingly dependent

on American finance and organization. Yet not America, but the far less

individualistic Germany, had become in the Russian mind the symbol of capitalism.

Self-righteous hate of Germany compensated Russia for her own betrayal of the

communistic ideal. This perverse antagonism was encouraged by the Americans; who,

strong in their own individualism and prosperity, and by now contemptuously tolerant

of Russian doctrines, were concerned only to keep Russian finance to themselves. In

truth, of course, it was America that had helped Russia's self-betrayal; and it was the

spirit of America that was most alien to the Russian spirit. But American wealth was

by now indispensable to Russia; so the hate due to America had to be borne

vicariously by Germany.

The Germans, for their part, were aggrieved that the Americans had ousted them from

a most profitable field of enterprise, and in particular from the exploitation of Russian

Asiatic oil. The economic life of the human race had for some time been based on

coal, but latterly oil had been found a far more convenient source of power; and as the

oil store of the planet was much smaller than its coal store, and the expenditure of oil

had of course been wholly uncontrolled and wasteful, a shortage was already being

felt. Thus the national ownership of the remaining oil fields had become a main factor

in politics and a fertile source of wars. America, having used up most of her own

supplies, was now anxious to compete with the still prolific sources under Chinese

control, by forestalling Germany in Russia. No wonder the Germans were aggrieved.

But the fault was their own. In the days when Russian communism had been seeking to convert the world, Germany had taken over England's leadership of individualistic

Europe. While greedy for trade with Russia, she had been at the same time frightened

of contamination by Russian social doctrine, the more so because communism had at

first made some headway among the German workers. Later, even when sane

industrial reorganization in Germany had deprived communism of its appeal to the

workers, and thus had rendered it impotent, the habit of anti-communist vituperation

persisted.

Thus the peace of Europe was in constant danger from the bickerings of two peoples

who differed rather in ideals than in practice. For the one, in theory communistic, had

been forced to delegate many of the community's rights to enterprising individuals;

while the other, in theory organized on a basis of private business, was becoming ever

more socialized.

Neither party desired war. Neither was interested in military glory, for militarism as

an end was no longer reputable. Neither was professedly nationalistic, for nationalism,

though still potent, was no longer vaunted. Each claimed to stand for internationalism

and peace, but accused the other of narrow patriotism. Thus Europe, though more

pacific than ever before, was doomed to war.

Like most wars, the Anglo-French War had increased the desire for peace, yet made

peace less secure. Distrust, not merely the old distrust of nation for nation, but a

devastating distrust of human nature, gripped men like the dread of insanity.

Individuals who thought of themselves as wholehearted Europeans, feared that at any

moment they might succumb to some ridiculous epidemic of patriotism and

participate in the further crippling of Europe.

This dread was one cause of the formation of a European Confederacy, in which all

the nations of Europe, save Russia, surrendered their sovereignty to a common

authority and actually pooled their armaments. Ostensibly the motive of this act was

peace; but America interpreted it as directed against herself, and withdrew from the

League of Nations. China, the "natural enemy" of America, remained within the

League, hoping to use it against her rivaFrom without, indeed, the Confederacy at first appeared as a close-knit whole; but

from within it was known to be insecure, and in every serious crisis it broke. There is

no need to follow the many minor wars of this period, though their cumulative effect

was serious, both economically and psychologically. Europe did at last, however,

become something like a single nation in sentiment, though this unity was brought

about less by a common loyalty than by a common fear of America.

Final consolidation was the fruit of the Russo-German War, the cause of which was

partly economic and partly sentimental. All the peoples of Europe had long watched

with horror the financial conquest of Russia by the United States, and they dreaded

that they also must presently succumb to the same tyrant. To attack Russia, it was

thought, would be to wound America in her only vulnerable spot. But the actual

occasion of the war was sentimental. Half a century after the Anglo-French War, a

second-rate German author published a typically German book of the baser sort. For

as each nation had its characteristic virtues, so also each was prone to characteristic

follies. This book was one of those brilliant but extravagant works in which the whole

diversity of existence is interpreted under a single formula, with extreme detail and

plausibility, yet with amazing naïveté. Highly astute within its own artificial universe,

it was none the less in wider regard quite uncritical. In two large volumes the author

claimed that the cosmos was a dualism in which a heroic and obviously Nordic spirit

ruled by divine right over an un-self-disciplined, yet servile and obviously Slavonic

spirit. The whole of history, and of evolution, was interpreted on this principle; and of

the contemporary world it was said that the Slavonic element was poisoning Europe.

One phrase in particular caused fury in Moscow, "the anthropoid face of the Russian

sub-man."

Moscow demanded apology and suppression of the book. Berlin regretted the insult,

but with its tongue in its cheek; and insisted on the freedom of the press. Followed a

crescendo of radio hate, and war.

The details of this war do not matter to one intent upon the history of mind in the

Solar System, but its result was important. Moscow, Leningrad and Berlin were

shattered from the air. The whole West of Russia was flooded with the latest and

deadliest poison gas, so that, not only was all animal and vegetable life destroyed, but

also the soil between the Black Sea and the Baltic was rendered infertile and uninhabitable for many years. Within a week the war was over, for the reason that the

combatants were separated by an immense territory in which life could not exist. But

the effects of the war were lasting. The Germans had set going a process which they

could not stop. Whiffs of the poison continued to be blown by fickle winds into every

country of Europe and Western Asia. It was spring-time; but save in the Atlantic

coast-lands the spring flowers shrivelled in the bud, and every young leaf had a

withered rim. Humanity also suffered; though, save in the regions near the seat of

war, it was in general only the children and the old people who suffered greatly. The

poison spread across the Continent in huge blown tresses, broad as principalities,

swinging with each change of wind. And wherever it strayed, young eyes, throats, and

lungs were blighted like the leaves.

America, after much debate, had at last decided to defend her interests in Russia by a

punitive expedition against Europe. China began to mobilize her forces. But long

before America was ready to strike, news of the widespread poisoning changed her

policy. Instead of punishment, help was given. This was a fine gesture of goodwill.

But also, as was observed in Europe, instead of being costly, it was profitable; for

inevitably it brought more of Europe under American financial control.

The upshot of the Russo-German war, then, was that Europe was unified in sentiment

by hatred of America, and that European mentality definitely deteriorated. This was

due in part to the emotional influence of the war itself, partly to the socially damaging

effects of the poison. A proportion of the rising generation had been rendered sickly

for life. During the thirty years which intervened before the Euro-American war,

Europe was burdened with an exceptional weight of invalids. First-class intelligence

was on the whole rarer than before, and was more strictly concentrated on the

practical work of reconstruction.

Even more disastrous for the human race was the fact that the recent Russian cultural

enterprise of harmonizing Western intellectualism and Eastern mysticism was now

wrecked.