The whole amount of tonnage of the American mercantile manner may be taken, in round numbers, at 2,000,000 tons, which may be subdivided as follows:
+===============+==========+ Ý ÝRegisteredÝ +---------------+----------+ Ý ÝTons Ý +---------------+----------+ ÝForeign trade Ý 700,000Ý +---------------+----------+ ÝWhale fishery Ý 130,000Ý +---------------+----------+ ÝEnrolled Ý Ý +---------------+----------+ ÝCoasting trade Ý 920,000Ý +---------------+----------+ ÝSteam Ý 150,000Ý +---------------+----------+ ÝCoast FisheriesÝ 100,000Ý +---------------+----------+ ÝTotal Ý 2,000,000Ý +===============+==========+
The American merchant vessels are generally sailed with fewer men than the British calculate five men to one hundred tons, which I believe to be about the just proportion. Mr Carey, in his work, estimates the proportion of seamen in American vessels to be 44 to every one hundred tons, and I shall assume his calculation as correct. The number of men employed in the American mercantile navy will be as follows:--
+===============+======+ Ý ÝMen Ý +---------------+------+ ÝForeign trade Ý30,333Ý +---------------+------+ ÝWhale fishery Ý 5,000Ý +---------------+------+ ÝCoasting trade Ý39,000Ý +---------------+------+ ÝSteam Ý 6,500Ý +---------------+------+ ÝCoast fisheriesÝ 4,333Ý +---------------+------+ ÝTotal Ý85,790Ý +===============+======+
And now I will submit, from the examinations I have made, the proportions of American and British seamen which are contained in this aggregate of 85,799 men.
In the foreign trade we have to deduct the masters of the ships, the mates, and the boys who are apprenticed to learn their duty, and rise to mates and masters (not to serve before the mast). These I estimate at:--
+==============================================+=====+ ÝMasters Ý1,500Ý +----------------------------------------------+-----+ ÝMates Ý3,000Ý +----------------------------------------------+-----+ ÝApprentices Ý1,500Ý +----------------------------------------------+-----+ ÝDitto, co'ld men, as cooks, stewards, etceteraÝ2,000Ý +----------------------------------------------+-----+ ÝTotal Ý8,000Ý +==============================================+=====+
which, deducted from 30,333, will leave 22,333 seamen in the foreign trade; who, with a slight intermixture of Swedes, Danes, and, more rarely, Americans, may be asserted to be all British seamen.
The next item is that of the men employed in the whale fishery; and, as near as I can ascertain the fact, the proportions are two-thirds Americans to one-third British. The total is 5,633; out of which 3,756 art Americans, and 1,877 British seamen.
The coasting trade employs 39,000 men; but only a small proportion of them can be considered as seamen, as it embraces all the internal river navigation.
The steam navigation employs 6,500 men, of whom of course not one in ten is a seaman.
The fisheries for cod and herring employ about 4,333 men; they are a mixture of Americans, Nova Scotians, and British, but the proportions cannot be ascertained; it is supposed that about one-half are British subjects, i.e. 2,166.
When, therefore, I estimate that the Americans employ at least thirty thousand of our seamen in their service, I do not think, as my subsequent remarks will prove, that I am at all overrating the case.
The questions which are now to be considered are, the nature of the various branches in which the seamen employed in the American marine are engaged, and how far they will be available to America in case of a war.
The coasting trade is chiefly composed of sloops, manned by two or three men and boys. The captain is invariably part, if not whole, owner of the vessel, and those employed are generally his sons, who work for their father, or some emigrant Irishmen, who, after a few months practice, are fully equal to this sort of fresh-water sailing. From the coasting trade, therefore, America would gain no assistance. Indeed, the majority of the coasting trade is so confined to the interior, that it would not receive much check from a war with a foreign country.
The coast fisheries might afford a few seamen, but very few; certainly not the number of men required to man her ships of war. As in the coasting trade, they are mostly owners or partners. In the whale fishery much the same system prevails; it is a common speculation; and the men embarking stipulate for such a proportion of the fish caught as their share of the profits. They are generally well to do, are connected together, and are the least likely of all men to volunteer on board of the American navy. They would speculate in privateers, if they did anything.
From steam navigation, of course, no seamen could be obtained.
Now, as all service is voluntary, it is evident that the only chance America has of manning her navy is from the thirty thousand British seamen in her employ, the other branches of navigation either not producing seamen, or those employed in them being too independent in situation to serve as foremast men. When I was at the different seaports, I made repeated inquiries as to the fact, if ever a lad was sent to sea as foremast-man, and I never could ascertain that it ever was the case. Those who are sent as apprentices, are learning their duty to receive the rating of mates, and ultimately fulfil the office of captains; and it may here be remarked, that many Americans, after serving as captains for a few years, return on shore and become opulent merchants; the knowledge which they have gained during their maritime career proving of the greatest advantage to them. There are a number of free black and coloured lads who are sent to sea, and who, eventually, serve as stewards and cooks; but it must be observed, that the masters and mates are not people who will enter before the mast and submit to the rigorous discipline of a government vessel, and the cooks and stewards are not seamen; so that the whale dependence of the American navy, in case of war, is upon the British seamen who are in her foreign trade and whale fisheries, and in her men-of-war in commission during the peace.
If America brings up none of her people to a seafaring life before the mast, now that her population is upwards of 13,000,000, still less likely was she to have done it when her population was less, and the openings to wealth by other channels were greater: from whence it may be fairly inferred, that, during our continued struggle with France, when America had the carrying trade in her hands, her vessels were chiefly manned by british seamen; and that when the war broke out between the two countries, the same British seamen who were in her employ manned her ships of war and privateers. It may be surmised that British seamen would refuse to be employed against their country. Some might; but there is no character so devoid of principle as the British sailor and soldier. In Dibdin's songs, we certainly have another version, "True to his country and king," etcetera, but I am afraid they do not deserve it: soldiers and sailors are mercenaries; they risk their lives for money; if is their trade to do so; and if they can get higher wages they never consider the justice of the cause, or whom they fight for. Now, America is a country peculiarly favourable for those who have little conscience or reflection; the same language is spoken there; the wages are much higher, spirits are much cheaper, and the fear of dejection or punishment is trifling: nay, there is none; for in five minutes a British seaman may be made a bona fide American citizen, and of course an American seaman. It is not surprising, therefore, that after sailing for years out of the American ports, in American vessels, the men, in case of war, should take the oath and serve. It is necessary for any one wanting to become an American citizen, that he should give notice of his intention; this notice gives him, as soon as he has signed his declaration, all the rights of an American citizen, excepting that of voting at elections, which requires a longer time, as specified in each state. The declaration is as follows:--
"That it is his bona fide intention to become a citizen of the United States, and to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign power, potentate, state, or sovereignty whatever, and particularly to Victoria, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, to whom he is now a subject." Having signed this document, and it being publicly registered, he becomes a citizen, and may be sworn to as such by any captain of merchant vessel or man-of-war, if it be required that he should do so.
During the last war with America, the Americans hit upon a very good plan as regarded the English seamen whom they had captured in our vessels. In the daytime the prison doors were shot and the prisoners were harshly treated; but at night, the doors were left open: the consequence was, that the prisoners whom they had taken added to their strength, for the men walked out, and entered on board their men-of-war and privateers.
This fact alone proves that I have not been too severe in my remarks upon the character of the English seamen; and since our seamen prove to be such "Dugald Dalgettys," it is to be hoped that, should we be so unfortunate as again to come in collision with America, the same plan may be adopted in this country.
Now, from the above remarks, three points are clearly deducible:--
1. That America always has obtained, and for a long period to come will obtain, her seamen altogether from Great Britain.
2. That those seamen can be naturalised immediately, and become American seamen by law.
3. That, under present circumstances, England is under the necessity of raising seamen, not only for her own navy, but also for the Americans; and that, in proportion as the commerce and shipping of America shall increase, so will the demand upon us become more onerous; and that should we fail in producing the number of seamen necessary for both services, the Americans will always be full manned, whilst any defalcation must fall upon ourselves.
And it may be added that, in all cases, the Americans have the choice and refusal of our men; and, therefore, they have invariably all the prime and best seamen which we have raised.
The cause of this is as simple as it is notorious; it is the difference between the wages paid in the navies and merchant vessels of the two nations:
+=========================+=========================+ Ý Ýpounds shils pounds shilsÝ +-------------------------+-------------------------+ ÝAmerican ships per month Ý 3 10Ý +-------------------------+-------------------------+ ÝBritish ships ditto Ý2 2 to 2 10 Ý +-------------------------+-------------------------+ ÝAmerican men-of-war dittoÝ 2 0Ý +-------------------------+-------------------------+ ÝBritish men-of-war ditto Ý 1 14Ý +=========================+=========================+
It will be observed, that in the American men-of-war the able-seaman's pay is only 2 pounds; the consequence is that they remain for months in port without being able to obtain men.
But we must now pass by this cause, and look to the origin of it; or, in other words, how is it that the Americans are able to give such high wages to our seamen as to secure the choice of any number of our best men for their service; and how is it that they can compete with, and even under-bid, our merchant vessels in freight, at the same time that they sail at a greater expense?
This has arisen partly from circumstances, partly from a series of mismanagement on our part, and partly from the fear of impressment. But it is principally to be ascribed to the former peculiarly unscientific mode of calculating the tonnage of our vessels; the error of which system induced the merchants to build their ships so as to evade the heavy channel and river duties; disregarding all the first principles of naval architecture, and considering the sailing properties of vessels as of no consequence.
The fact is, that we over-taxed our shipping.
In order to carry as much freight as possible, and, at the same time, to pay as few of the onerous duties, our mercantile shipping generally assumed more the form of floating bores of merchandise than sailing vessels; and by the false method of measuring the tonnage, they were enabled to carry 600 tons, when, by measurement, they were only taxed as being of the burden of 400 tons: but every increase of tonnage thus surreptitiously obtained, was accompanied with a decrease in the sailing properties of the vessels. Circumstances, however, rendered this of less importance during the war, as few vessels ran without the protection of a convoy; and it must be also observed, that vessels being employed in one trade only, such as the West India, Canada, Mediterranean, etcetera, their voyages during the year were limited, and they were for a certain portion of the year unemployed.