The Disgraceful Yang

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However, philosophy does not answer questions in a rash and arbitrary way, as we do in everyday life, or even in science, but first explores what is confusing about such questions and recognizes the ambiguities and confusions that lurk in our everyday perceptions, and then answers them critically.

Here we have already begun to encounter a distinction that constitutes the greatest philosophical difficulty, namely, the distinction between "the present" and "the real.

The distinction between the "present" and the "real", between what things seem to be and what they really are. The painter wants to know

the painter wants to know what things seem to be, the practitioner and the philosopher want to know what they really are, and the philosopher's desire to know is stronger than the practitioner's.

The philosopher's desire to know is stronger than the practitioner's, and because he knows the difficulty of answering this question, he is more troubled.

Here again, the senses do not seem to offer us the truth about the table itself, but only about the phenomena of the table.

Apart from the mind and the ideas of the mind, there is

There is nothing real except the mind and the ideas of the mind. Such a philosopher is called a "mentalist".

If it does not answer as many questions as we would like, philosophy has at least the right to ask questions that will increase curiosity about the world and point out the wonders and mysteries that lurk beneath the surface of the most mundane things of everyday life.

Chapter 2

In a sense, it must be admitted that we can never prove the existence of those things outside of ourselves and outside of our experience. The world is made up of my thoughts, feelings, and sensations, and everything else is purely metaphysical, - there is no logical fallacy in this assumption.

We accept this natural point of view: there are indeed objects other than ourselves and our sense material, and their existence is not dependent on our awareness of them. Of course, we did not originally believe in an independent external world by arguments. We find that we already have this belief as soon as we begin to think about it: that is, the so-called instinctive belief.

Many beliefs are entangled with other beliefs by habit and association. These so-called other beliefs are not actually instinctive

They are simply mistaken for part of instinctive beliefs. Philosophy should show us the hierarchy of instinctive beliefs, starting with those to which we must adhere, and, as far as possible, taking each of them from the disparate to the more complex.

It should show us the hierarchy of instinctive beliefs, starting with those to which we are most attached, and isolating and separating each from the irrelevant attachments as far as possible. It is prudent to note that our instinctive beliefs, in their final

It should be carefully noted that our instinctive beliefs, in their final form, should not contradict each other, but should constitute a harmonious system.

Of course, all of our beliefs or any of them may be wrong, and therefore all beliefs should be treated with at least a little suspicion. However, unless we base ourselves on some other belief, we cannot have a reason to reject a belief. Therefore, by organizing our instinctive beliefs and their conclusions, by examining which of them (if necessary) are possible to revise and which to abandon, and then accepting what we instinctively believe as our only material; on this basis, we can make our knowledge organized and systematic, and although there is still the possibility of error in it, we can, because of The possibility of error is reduced by the interrelationship of the parts and by the critical examination carried out before acquiescence.

For those who have once begun to doubt the exactness of common sense, philosophy must also suffice to justify the painstaking labor involved in philosophical problems.